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The efficient market hypothesis: Evidence from ten African 
stock markets 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION* 
 
Since the work by Fama (1965, 1970), the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) has become a central part of 
finance theory. The vast body of research done around 
this concept is evidence of the interest that the EMH 
has drawn in both the investment and academic 
circles. However, the bulk of this evidence is from 
developed markets in the United States and Europe 
(Groenewold and Ariff, 1998; Mobarek and Keasey, 
2000). Little is known about the efficiency of emerging 
markets, especially those in Africa. The studies 
available on African stock markets mostly made use of 
indices data. This is more so in studies that have 
included more than one market (e.g., Appiah-Kusi and 
Menyah, 2003). 
 
The majority of studies relating to market efficiency 
with respect to African stock markets have been 
conducted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). Smith et al. (2002), Smith and Jefferis (2002) 
and Magnusson and Wydick (2002), among others, 
found the JSE to be weak-form efficient. Appiah-Kusi 
and Menyah (2003), however, concluded on the 
contrary that the JSE is not weak-form efficient for the 
period 1990 to 1995, using weekly data. 
 
Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003) found the stock 
markets of Botswana, Ghana and the Ivory Coast not 
to be weak-form efficient for the respective periods 
investigated1.  The findings for Ghana and Botswana 
are consistent with those by Magnusson and Wydick 
(2002) who found the two markets not to conform to 
random walk 3 and random walk 2, respectively. 
Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003) concluded that 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Morocco and Mauritius are 
weak-form efficient2. Kiweu (1991) and Dickinson and 
Muragu (1994) reached the same conclusion for 
Kenya, for the periods 1986 to 1990 and 1979 to 1988, 
respectively, while Chiwira (2001) found the Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange to be weak-form efficient for the 
period 1995 to 1999. Smith et al. (2002) concluded, on 
the contrary, that Egypt, Morocco and Mauritius are 
not weak-form efficient for the periods January 1990 to 
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1The periods investigated were 1989 to 1995 for Botswana, 
1990 to 1995 for Ghana and 1992 to 1995 for the Ivory Coast. 
 
2For Kenya and Zimbabwe, the periods investigated were 1990 
to 1995, while for Morocco it was 1990 to 1994, Mauritius 1989 
to 1995 and Egypt 1993 to 1995. 
 
August 1998 for Morocco and Mauritius, and January 
1993 to August 1998 for Egypt. Bundoo (2000) 
reached the same conclusion for the Stock Exchange 
of Mauritius (SEM) for the period 1992 to 1998. Asal 
(2000) also found the Egyptian Stock Exchange to be 
weak-form inefficient for the period 1992 to 1996, 
although he suggested that it was moving towards 
efficiency in 1997.  
 
Studies that have used data on individual stocks used 
either monthly or weekly data rather than daily data. 
The limiting factor, among others, as pointed out by 
Dickinson and Muragu (1994), has been the non-
availability of computerised databases. The other 
argument for using data measured over longer time 
intervals is the problem of thin-trading.  Increasing the 
time interval is argued to reduce the potential biases 
associated with thin-trading by increasing the 
probability of having at least one trade in the interval 
(Dickinson and Muragu, 1994). The trade, most 
probably, would not have taken place at the end of the 
interval. The result of this is what Bowie (1994) 
referred to as the “price age”3 component. This 
component of thin-trading, though more critical in long 
time horizons, is usually ignored.  
 
Although some studies on African stock markets have 
acknowledged the thin-trading problem, very few have 
gone beyond mere acknowledgement of the existence 
of the problem. The limited studies that tried to 
address the thin-trading problem include Asal (2000) 
on the Egyptian Stock Exchange and Appiah-Kusi and 
Menyah (2003) on eleven African stock markets. Both 
studies used the adjustment method by Miller, 
Muthuswany and Whaley (1994) for index returns.  
 
This paper studies the weak-form efficiency of ten 
African stock markets using the serial correlation and 
runs tests. To address the problem of thin-trading, 
returns are calculated on a trade-to-trade basis and 
adjusted for variability in the interval lengths. This 
adjustment is done by weighting the trade-to-trade 
returns by the number of days between trades (see 
Mlambo, Biekpe and Smit, 2003).  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
gives a general overview of African stock markets. 
                                                
3“Price age” is defined as the time that lapses between the last 
trade in a given period and the end of that period. This price age 
factor is important in that when a share is not traded at the end 
of a given time interval, then the price at which the share was 
last traded is incorrectly taken to be the price at the end of the 
interval under perspective. 
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Section 3 describes the data and methodology used. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results 
while section 5 summarises and concludes the paper. 
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN STOCK 
MARKETS 
 
2.1 The emergence 
 
About two-thirds of African stock markets emerged in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mlambo and Biekpe, 
2001; Moss, 2004). The latest arrival is the Douala 
Stock Exchange in Cameroon, which was established 
in 2003, making it the youngest stock market on the 
African continent. Most of these markets were formed 
at the instigation of government to act as vehicles to 
privatise state-owned enterprises (Mlambo and 
Biekpe, 2001; Moss, 2004). This is contrary to 
misconceptions in some circles that donor agencies, in 
particular the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, are the driving forces behind the establishment 
of stock markets in Africa.  
 
African stock exchanges are also the smallest in the 
world in terms of both number of listed stocks and 
market capitalisation (see Table 1). They are also 
small relative to their economies, with the market 
capitalisation of the Nigerian Stock Exchange only 
representing 8 percent of gross national product 
(GNP), while in the case of Zimbabwe, Kenya and 
Ghana, the market capitalisations ranged from 25 
percent to 35 percent of GNP (Kenny and Moss, 
1998). The largest African stock market in terms of 
market capitalisation is the JSE (Table 1). According to 
Senbet (2000), the market capitalisation of the JSE is 
ten times the combined capitalisation of the rest of 
Africa’s stock markets and over 100 times their 
average. Of the more than 2 000 firms listed on 
Africa’s stock exchanges, the majority are listed on 
Egypt’s Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges 
(CASE), although only a small percentage of these are 
actively traded.  
 
2.2 Trading times and trading systems 
 
The majority of stock markets in Africa trade daily, 
from Monday to Friday (Sunday to Thursday in Egypt), 
except for a few such as Ghana4, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, which, in 2002 were trading three times a 
week. Ghana was trading on Monday, Wednesday and 
Friday, while Tanzania and Uganda were trading on 
Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday (see Table 2). 
Trading times also vary, ranging from one hour per 
trading day in Tanzania to the whole business day 
from 08h00 to 16h30 in Zimbabwe (see Table 2). 
 
                                                
4Ghana is now trading daily as from 2004. 
 
Trading methods on African stock exchanges vary 
from open-outcry to call-over to electronic trading 
systems (Table 2). The Nigerian stock market has 
replaced the call-over trading system with the 
automated trading system (ATS). Clearing, settlement 
and delivery of transactions on the exchange are now 
done electronically by the Central Securities Clearing 
System (CSCS).  Following the closure of the open-
outcry trading floor in June 1996, the JSE introduced 
an order driven, centralised, automated trading system 
known as the JSE Equities Trading (JET) system. In 
May 2002 the JET system was converted to the Stock 
Exchange Trading Systems (SETS) used on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). SETS is a world-class, 
flexible and robust trading platform that promise 
improved liquidity and ensure more efficient 
functionality. SETS also allows South African based 
companies access to offshore privileges without 
having to move offshore. Other markets that adopted 
the JSE’s trading system include Ghana and the 
Namibia Stock Exchanges.  
 
Migration from an open outcry to an electronic trading 
system on the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) 
took place between 4 March 1997 and 15 June 1998. 
All securities quoted on the CSE are now traded on the 
electronic trading system. Orders entered by dealers 
are automatically sorted by price limit and in 
chronological order, in the "market order book". On the 
central market, the less liquid securities are quoted on 
a call auction or fixing basis (once per session). The 
more liquid securities are quoted on a continuous 
basis. The electronic trading system automatically 
downloads to a market information system. This 
means that data providers can receive real-time 
market data (time, price, number of shares traded, 
etc), just as it appears on the dealers' screens. 
 
2.3 Trading costs, foreign investment and 
capital flows restrictions 
 
The sudden supply of vast amounts of mobile capital in 
the early 1990s created an environment conducive for 
the emergence of stock markets in Africa. However, up 
until now, portfolio inflows to Africa have been 
disappointing. One possible reason for this 
unfavourable scenario is that the acquisition of shares 
by foreigners is limited on some African stock markets 
(see Table 3). The prohibitive institutional barriers, 
trading costs, and factors such as foreign exchange 
risk, political risk and informational and institutional 
barriers, act as disincentives to foreign portfolio 
investments. Some African stock markets still operate 
in regulatory environments with restrictive capital flow 
controls on the remittance of capital, capital gains, 
dividends, interest payments, returns and other 
earnings (Mlambo and Biekpe, 2001).  
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Table 1: Age and size of African stock markets 
Source: World Development Indicators 2002, 2002 
 
In Malawi, for example, the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
(RBM) manages the exchange control. Foreign 
investment capital, whether in the form of equity or 
loans, needs to be registered with the RBM. Foreign 
loans and equity investments, the remittance of 
dividends and capital, among other transfers, require 
permission from the RBM. In the case of Mozambique, 
remittance of funds overseas is restricted. Foreign 
investors can remit loan repayments, dividends and 
capital if permission has been obtained for amounts 
above US$5000. In Zimbabwe, dividend remittances in 
respect of projects approved by the Zimbabwe 
Investment Centre are allowed at 100 percent of after 
tax profits. Capital is blocked and may be remitted 
through 20-year 4 percent government bonds, 
denominated in Zimbabwean dollars. Capital is paid in 
10 equal annual instalments at the end of years 11 to 
20. 
 
In some countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, 
Zambia and Uganda, there are no foreign exchange 
controls. Profits, dividends and capital can be freely 
repatriated. In Ghana, the financial regime is relatively 
flexible and allows the free transfer of foreign currency 
in and out of Ghana. A foreign investor may, subject to 
approval, operate a foreign currency account with 
banks in Ghana. In Kenya, the Foreign Investment 
Protection Act guarantees that foreign investors can 
convert and repatriate capital freely. The Exchange 
Control Act was repealed in 1995, removing the last of 
the restrictions on profit remittances and borrowing.  
 
Namibia, as part of the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) with South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho, has 
unrestricted capital flows for non-residents. Capital, 
profits and dividends can be repatriated. Exchange 
control limitations do apply to resident capital flows. 
South Africa has adopted the approach of gradually 
abolishing exchange controls. Restrictions on non-
resident capital flows were fully liberalised with the 
abolition of the financial Rand in 1995. Restrictions on 
residents are gradually being relaxed. In Swaziland, 
there are no foreign exchange restrictions between 
CMA members. However, exchange controls between 
CMA members and the rest of the world may not be 
less strict than those of South Africa. 
 
Stock Exchange 
 YEAR 2000 STATISTICS YEAR 2002 STATISTICS 
Main stock 
exchange index 
Year 
formed 
Mkt Cap 
(US$’m) 
Mkt Cap 
(%GDP) 
No. of 
firms 
listed 
Value 
traded 
(%GDP) 
Turn-
over 
ratio (%) 
Mkt Cap 
(US$'m) 
Value 
traded 
(US$'m) 
No. of 
firms 
listed 
Algeria   - - - - - 145 0 3 LA All Share 
Botswana 1989 978 18,497 16 0,895 4,78 1 717 62 19 BSE Domestic 
Cameroon (Doula) 2003 - - - - -  -  -   -   -  
Cote d’Ivoire 
(Abidjan)  1974 - - - - -  -  -   -   -  
Cote d’Ivoire 
(BRVM)  1998 1185 12,650 41 0,355 2,59 1 329 16 38 BRVM 10 
Egypt (Cairo & 
Alexandria) 
1903, 
1888 28741 29,112 1076 11,264 34,74 26 245 7 362 1151 CMA General  
Ghana 1989 502 9,680 22 0,195 1,48 382 11 24 GSE All Share 
Kenya (Nairobi) 1954 1283 12,389 57 0,458 3,58 1 676 36 50 NSE 20 Share 
Malawi (Blantyre) 1996 - - - - - 107 3 8 
MSE Domestic 
Share 
Mauritius (Port 
Louis) 1989 1331 30,383 40 1,722 5,01 1 324 59 40 SEMDEX 
Morocco 
(Casablanca) 1929 10899 32,686 53 3,280 9,22 8 319 922 56 
Morocco All 
Share 
Mozambique 
(Maputo) 1999 - - - - -  -  -   -   -  
Namibia 1992 311 8,945 13 0,634 4,51 201 129 13 
NSX Local 
Companies 
Nigeria 1960 4237 10,313 195 0,640 7,29 5 989 486 195 NSE All Share 
South Africa 
(Johannesburg) 1887 204952 162,806 616 61,558 33,9 182 616 76 792 472 JSE All Share 
Sudan (Khartoum) 1994 - - - - -  -  -   -   -  
Swaziland 1990 - - - - - 146 0 5 SSX All Share 
Tanzania (Dar es 
Salaam) 1998 181 2,100 4 0,100 3,4 695 19 5 LA All Share 
Tunisia (Tunis) 1969 2828 14,529 44 3,215 23,29 1 810 704 46 TUNINDEX 
Uganda 1997 - - - - - 52 1 3 LA All Share 
Zambia (Lusaka)  1993 291 9,200 8 0,400 4,7 231 2 11 LuSE All Share 
Zimbabwe 1896 2432 32,906 69 3.776 10,77 11 689 131 77 ZSE Industrial 
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Table 2: Trading arrangements on African stock markets, 2002 
Stock 
Exchange 
Website Trading days Trading hours Trading method Clearing & 
Settlement 
Settlemen
t Cycle 
Algeria www.cosob.com.d
z  
 Mon  09h30 to 11h10  Automated trading 
system (ATS) Electronic T+4 
Botswana www.bse.bw  Mon to Fri 09h00 to 09h30 
& 15h00 to 
15h30 
Call-over system with 
presiding officer Manual,  
T by T# T+5 
Cameroon 
(Douala) 
 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cote d’Ivoire 
(Abidjan)  
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed 
Cote d’Ivoire 
(BRVM)  
www.brvm.org  Mon to Fri 10h45 to 12h00 electronic fixing or 
computerised  trading 
system n.a. T+5 
Egypt (Cairo & 
Alexandria) 
www.egyptse.com  Sun to Thurs 11h30 to 15h30 Electronic order-
driven or computer 
based trading with 
automated matching  
Manual, T by 
T T+4 
Ghana www.gse.com.gh  Mon, Wed, & 
Fri 
10h00 to 13h00 Call-over with a 
limited auction 
Manual, T by 
T T+5 
Kenya (Nairobi) www.nse.co.ke  Mon to Fri 10h00 to 12h00 Open outcry, 
continuous order-
driven system 
Manual, T by 
T T+5 
Malawi 
(Blantyre) 
www.mse.co.mw  Mon to Fri 09h00 to 12h00 Call-over floor-based 
system T by T T+7 
Mauritius (Port 
Louis) 
www.semdex.com  Mon to Fri 
(Official); Tues 
& Thurs (OTC) 
10h00 to 11h00 
(Official); 14h00 
to 15h00 (OTC) 
Screen-based ATS; 
order-driven and 
single price auction  
Automated, 
Strict Delivery 
versus 
Payment 
Rolling 
T+3 
Morocco 
(Casablanca) 
www.casablanca-
bourse.com  
Mon to Fri 08h30 to 12h30 ATS  Manual, T by 
T T+3 
Mozambique 
(Maputo) 
 - - - - - 
Namibia www.nsx.com.na  Mon to Fri 09h00 to 16h00 
(summer) 
08h00 to 15h00 
(winter) 
Computer-based 
ATS JSE Equity 
Trading System 
(JET) 
Manual, T by 
T 
T+5 
rolling 
Nigeria www.thenigerianst
ockexchange.com  
Mon to Fri From 11h00 
until all bids are 
done 
Automated computer-
based auction 
system 
Delivery 
Versus 
Payment 
netting off 
process. T+3 
South Africa 
(Johannesburg) 
www.jse.co.za  Mon to Fri 09h00 to 16h00 JET order-driven, 
continuous auction 
on a trading floor 
Electronic- 
STRATE 
Rolling 
T+5 
Sudan 
(Khartoum) 
   -   -    -   
    
Swaziland www.ssx.org.sz  Mon to Fri 10h00 to 12h00 Call-over floor-based 
system T by T T+5 
Tanzania (Dar 
es Salaam) 
www.darstock.com  Tue, Wed, 
Thurs 
10h00 to 11h00 Open outcry auction 
system 
Electronic, 
transaction-
by-transaction T+5 
Tunisia (Tunis) www.bvmt.com.tn  Mon to Fri 09h00 to 12h30  Electronic order-
driven (liquid stocks). 
Fixing basis (less 
liquid stocks) Automatically T+5 
Uganda www.ugandacapit
almarkets.co.ug  
Tue to Thurs 10h00 to 12h00 Call-over floor-based 
system T by T T+5 
Zambia 
(Lusaka)  
www.luse.co.zm  Mon to Fri 10h00 to 11h00 
(1st session) 
12h00 to 13h00 
(2nd session) 
Single price auction, 
order-matching 
Automated T+3 
Zimbabwe www.zse.co.zw  Mon to Fri 08h00 to 16h30 Call-over, floor-based 
system T by T T+7 
# T by T: Transaction by transaction 
Sources: Stock exchange websites 
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Table 3: Trading costs and foreign investment restrictions 
Stock Exchange Market regulator Withholding taxes Commission 
rates 
Foreign Investment Ceilings 
Interest Dividends 
Capital 
gains Individual Collectively 
Algeria 
Commission 
d’Organisation et de 
Surveillance des 
Opérations de 
Bourses (COSOB) 
None None None - No restrictions  
Botswana 
The Botswana 
Stock Exchange 
Committee 
15% 15% None 1% to 2% 5% 49% 
Cameroon (Doula)   -  - - - - - - 
Cote d’Ivoire 
(Abidjan)  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cote d’Ivoire 
(BRVM)  
Conseil Régional de 
l'Epargne Publique 
et des Marchés 
Financiers 
(CREPMF) 
None 10% None - No restrictions 
Egypt (Cairo & 
Alexandria) 
Capital Markets 
Authority 15%  None None No fixed rates 
No restrictions 
  
Ghana 
Securities 
Exchange 
Commission 
15% 10% None 1% to 2,5% 10% 74% 
Kenya (Nairobi) Capital Markets Authority 15%* 5%* None 1,1% to 2% 5% 40% 
Malawi (Blantyre) 
The Stock 
Exchange 
Committee 
20%** None 35%** 1% to 2% 10% 49% 
Mauritius (Port 
Louis) 
Financial Services 
Commission None None None 0,9% to 1,25% 
Open to foreign investors 
  
Morocco 
(Casablanca) 
Conseil 
Deontologique des 
Valeurs Mobilieres. 
(CDVM) 
10% None None 0,6%–0,3% No restrictions   
Mozambique 
(Maputo)   -  - - - - - - 
Namibia NA 10% None None 0,35% to 1,1% 
No restrictions. However, 
needs Central Bank approval 
to take over a bank  
Nigeria 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
10% 10% None 1% to 2,75% No restrictions  
South Africa 
(Johannesburg) 
Financial Services 
Board Based on marginal tax rates 1,2%–0,2% 
15% (banks), 25% (insurance 
companies) 
Sudan (Khartoum)   -  - - - - - - 
Swaziland Capital Markets Development Unit 10% 15% None 1% to 2% No restrictions 
Tanzania (Dar es 
Salaam) 
Dar-es-Salam Stock 
Exchange 5% 5% None 1,1% to 2% Closed to foreign investors  
Tunisia (Tunis) Conseil du Marché Financier None None None   49.9% in general  
Uganda Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 15% 15% None 1,1% to 2% No restrictions  
Zambia (Lusaka)  
The Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
15% 15% None fixed 0,25% No restrictions  
Zimbabwe ZSE Committee 10% 15% 10% 1% to 2% 10% 40% 
*These are for residents only. For non-residents the tax rates are 12.5% on interest and 7.5% on dividends 
**Also for residents. For non-residents the tax rates are 15% on interest and 35% on capital gains 
Source: Stock exchange websites 
 
 
In Tanzania, foreign exchange controls were removed 
through the Foreign Exchange Act of 1992. Capital 
transfers are however still subject to approval by the 
Bank of Tanzania. Profits and dividends can be fully 
repatriated. In Nigeria, foreign investors are 
guaranteed unconditional transfer of their capital and 
profits. Importation or exportation of foreign exchange 
above US$5 000 is declared. A domiciliary account 
can be opened in foreign currency at banks and cash 
withdrawals from such accounts are permissible. For 
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purposes of exchange control and monitoring the flow 
of foreign currencies, authorised dealers are required 
to inform the central bank whenever transfers larger 
than US$10 000 are made into a domiciliary account.  
 
2.4 The market regulator 
 
Some of the African stock markets were established 
on the back of poor regulatory and legislative 
frameworks. This, among other things, explains why 
some of these markets lack the capacity to deal with 
capital market dynamics. Legislations to prevent 
insider trading are either inadequate or non-existent, 
and where they exist, enforcement is often poor. The 
inadequacy of insider trading laws on African stock 
markets has enhanced the perception that these 
markets are not efficient. Insider trading has been one 
of the problems historically faced by the JSE. South 
Africa is one of the countries in Africa with insider 
trading laws. However, no prosecution for insider 
trading has taken place in South Africa due to the 
inadequacy of the legislation and the existence of lax 
and unenforceable laws. 
 
The successful integration of African markets into the 
world financial system requires regulatory frameworks 
that conform to international standards. An appropriate 
legal and regulatory framework, sufficiently monitored, 
is a necessity to protect investors and the integrity of 
the markets. It also helps to instil confidence, a sense 
of fairness and financial discipline in the market. In 
most countries the regulator is a government agency, 
the central bank, finance ministry or an independent 
commission (see Table 3). In some countries, the 
capital market is accorded regulatory powers to 
become a self-regulatory body, or the power to 
regulate is a shared responsibility between two or 
more agencies.  
 
2.5 Market microstructures 
 
African stock markets are also known to be illiquid and 
characterised by thin trading (Mlambo and Biekpe, 
2005), in comparison to stock markets in other regions. 
According to Kenny and Moss (1998), 8 of the world’s 
12 most illiquid stock exchanges in 1995 were in 
Africa.  
 
Expected annual volatility is also, on average, high on 
the African markets. In Erb, Harvey and Viskanta. 
(1996), volatility was an average 35,6 percent on 
African markets compared to 21,4 percent for the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
developed equity markets, measured using the 
countries’ risk ratings. Kenny and Moss (1998) 
suggested that this extreme volatility is a result of the 
small size nature, lack of liquidity and, often, unstable 
political and economic environments. The higher 
expected volatilities on the African stock markets, 
implying higher risk, however, also imply higher 
expected returns as compensation for the risk. Erb, et 
al. (1996) found the average expected return for Africa 
to be quite high at 18,4 percent.  The ability of African 
markets to attract investors, despite the high risks, 
rests upon the relatively higher returns these markets 
potentially give on investments. 
 
African stock markets lack integration with world equity 
markets and also with each other.  Erb, et al. (1996) 
found the average correlation of African stock markets 
with world equity markets to be a low 0,05 percent. 
The segmentation of African markets implies that 
investors demand compensation in the form of higher 
expected returns for their risk exposure. However, the 
lack of integration of African stock markets with global 
equity markets make them potentially good portfolio 
diversifiers. African markets, except the JSE, were not 
affected by the Asian crisis due to the lack of 
interdependence with other global emerging markets 
(Collins and Biekpe, 2001).  
  
2.6 The delay to regional integration 
 
A stock market is perceived by African governments to 
be an indication of integration into the global economy. 
It is considered to be a sign of international legitimacy 
and a measure of a country’s modernisation and 
commitment to private sector-led development (Moss, 
2004). Therefore, the emergence of stock markets on 
the African continent seems more like an explicit 
response by African governments to globalisation and 
a desire to be included. In Africa, a stock market is 
regarded as a symbol of national prestige and 
progress, similar to a national airline, or a mark of 
sovereignty, similar to flags or national anthems 
(Turner, 1999). According to Moss (2004), both the 
national airline and the stock exchange serve very 
important symbolic and practical purposes, yet they 
come at a cost that may not rationally justify their 
existence.  
 
The symbolic significance of a stock market to African 
governments has contributed to the lack of progress in 
integrating regional stock exchanges. The critical 
prohibiting factor is location. The African Stock 
Exchange Association (ASEA) has a long-term plan to 
consolidate the various national stock exchanges into 
regional hubs based in Johannesburg, Nairobi, 
Abidjan, Lagos and Cairo. According to Mlambo and 
Biekpe (2001), an integrated real time network for 
SADC stock exchanges was expected to be up and 
running by the year 2006 but it has not yet 
materialised. The only regional stock exchange in 
Africa, the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières 
(BRVM) was made possible by the fact that Cote 
d’Ivoire had been the only West African franc zone 
member country with a Stock Exchange and Abidjan 
was by far the main commercial centre in the zone. 
Even though Gabon was pushing to have the 
exchange located in its capital Libreville, the other 
members resisted, with each of them wanting to play 
host (Moss, 2004). The BRVM serves the 8 French-
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speaking member countries of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UMOEA), namely 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.  
 
The problem of location is not only with regional stock 
exchanges but national stock exchanges as well. The 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) was established as 
the Lagos Stock Exchange in 1960. When the 
government moved offices to Abuja in 1991, there 
were fears that the newly privatised enterprises might 
still use Lagos as their headquarters instead of moving 
to the new capital, Abuja. Therefore, propositions were 
made to open another stock exchange in Abuja and a 
branch of the NSE was recently opened there. If Africa 
could embrace Information Technology, a physically 
existing brick-and-mortar exchange trading floor would 
become less significant as the trend is moving towards 
electronic trading. Therefore, the issue of location will 
inevitably be resolved. Electronic trading will also 
encourage liquidity and efficiency, two characteristics 
that have been lacking on the African stock markets. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
The markets studied in this paper are Egypt, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Morocco, Mauritius, Tunisia, Ghana, 
Namibia, Botswana and the West African Regional 
Stock Exchange (Bourse Regionale des Valeurs 
Mobilieres - BRVM) in Cote d’Ivoire.5 The data used in 
this study are daily closing stock prices and volume 
traded for individual stocks. The data for Egypt, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Morocco and Mauritius were obtained from 
DataStream and comparisons were made with 
samples from the respective stock exchanges and/or 
stockbrokers (e.g. the Nairobi Stock Exchange for 
Kenya, Casablanca Stock Exchange for Morocco, 
BARDNET and Kingdom Stockbrokers for Zimbabwe) 
to determine reliability and accuracy.  
 
For Botswana, Namibia and the BRVM, the data were 
obtained from the respective stock exchanges while for 
Ghana and Tunisia at least two sources were 
consulted. These are Tunisie Valeurs, Tustex and 
Financiere de Placement et de Gestion (FPG) for 
Tunisia; Databank and SDC Brokerages for Ghana. 
For all the markets in the study, volume traded data 
                                                
5Although the markets were selected according to data 
availability the JSE is excluded from the sample of African stock 
markets studied here because of its large size of around 80% of 
total market capitalisation of African stock markets in aggregate, 
which put it in a league of its own and will thus be better 
categorised with the emerging markets of Asia and Latin 
America. The second largest African stock market in terms of 
market capitalisation is Egypt, which is about 11% of the total 
African stock markets capitalisation. Again South Africa has 
been relatively widely researched in comparison with the other 
African stock markets. The intention of this study was to bring 
more focus on those markets but have lingered in the 
background of the limelight. 
 
were obtained and used to determine the trading 
frequencies and durations of non-trading of the 
different stocks. A stock is included in the sample as 
long as it has been listed for the entire period under 
consideration; it has not been part of an acquisition or 
merger during the period under review; it has not been 
suspended from trade for a period longer than a week; 
and it has enough data points to make a meaningful 
analysis. The period examined for each market is 
shown in Table 4, which also shows the thin-trading6 
frequencies for each market. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, the markets in this study 
exhibit serious thin-trading for the periods under 
investigation. For Namibia, the lowest thin-trading 
frequency is 62%. If such a thin-trading frequency is 
considered serious, then all the stocks in the Namibian 
sample can be said to have serious thin-trading. Other 
relatively thin-traded markets are Botswana with the 
lowest thin-trading frequency of 34% and Mauritius 
with 14%. Interestingly, most of the stocks on the 
Namibian and Botswana stock exchanges have dual 
listings on the JSE. Probably, trading in these stocks 
takes place more on the JSE than on these other 
markets. Because the majority of stocks on the 
Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX) are dual-listings on 
the JSE (68% of stocks in our sample), the NSX is 
usually not open for trade whenever there is a holiday 
in South Africa. 
 
This paper uses continuously compounded returns 
calculated on a trade-to-trade basis and adjusted for 
interval variability, following Mlambo et al. (2003)7. 
According to Mlambo and Biekpe (2005), the 
conclusion on whether a market is efficient or not is 
subject to the methodology used, especially in 
adjusting for the thin-trading effect. Bowie (1994) 
argued in favour of the trade-to-trade approach in 
measuring stock returns on a thinly traded market. 
 
 
                                                
6The thin-trading referred to here is rather non-trading, whereby 
a stock does not trade every consecutive interval. On the other 
hand is non-synchronous trading, whereby a stock can trade 
every consecutive interval but not necessarily at the end of the 
interval. The focus on the former is because the later requires 
historical prices for periods shorter than a day and these data 
are not available for most African stock markets. Most of the 
markets only open for a few hours in a day and non-trading, 
without considering non-synchronous trading, is, in itself, a very 
big problem. 
 
7Each trade-to-trade return is ‘weighted’ by the interval length, 
which in this case is the number of days between trades. This 
does not mean getting averages and allocating them to each of 
the days within a trading period as might be incorrectly 
interpreted. In fact only the day when there was trade is 
considered and all the days not traded are ignored or left out. 
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Table 4: Data and thin-trading properties 
 
Stock 
Exchange 
Year 
Established 
Data Sampling period* # Trading 
days 
Sample 
size 
Sample thin-trading frequency
range median average std dev
Botswana 1989 23 Mar 98 - 31 May 02 1035 12 34-94% 73% 69% 0,21 
BRVM 1998 04 Jan 99 - 31 Dec 02 687 24 03-95% 65% 65% 0,22 
Egypt 1888/1903 02 Jan 97 - 31 May 02 1342 54 05-74% 18% 29% 0,24 
Ghana 1989 02 Jan 98 - 30 Dec 02 753 20 10-87% 70% 58% 0,25 
Kenya 1954 02 Jan 97 - 31 May 02 1366 40 02-97% 53% 49% 0,30 
Mauritius 1989 01 Jun 98 - 31 Dec 02 1197 9 14-52% 29% 31% 0,14 
Morocco 1929 02 Jan 97 - 31 May 02 1349 36 01-97% 49% 45% 0,33 
Namibia 1992 02 Jan 97 - 31 May 02 1341 15 62-98% 87% 85% 0,10 
Tunisia 1969 02 Jan 98 - 31 Dec 02 1250 35 02-91% 32% 39% 0,31 
Zimbabwe 1896(1946) 02 Jan 97 - 31 May 02 1353 39 04-94% 49% 51% 0,23 
Notes: *The variability in the sampling periods is due, among other reasons, to the availability of the data. The BRVM, for example, was 
established towards the end of 1998 and thus the data series could only start after 1998. Mauritius, though established in 1989, 
changed to daily trading in 1998 and therefore this period was chosen so as not to distort the data series. The Botswana Stock 
Exchange only started recording transactions data on a daily basis in March 1998 when it introduced the computerised trading system. 
A large number of stocks were listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange after the introduction of electronic trading in 1997 and thus the 
choice of this starting date.  For Ghana it was difficult to access data prior to 1998.  
Thin-trading frequency is measured as the number of days a stock does not trade out of the total number of days the stock exchange 
was open for trade for the period studied. A thin trading frequency of 62% would imply a stock not trading in 62 out of every 100 trading 
days. 
 
 
The adjusted trade-to-trade returns are calculated as 
follows: 
 
t t t Kt
t
1R ln(P ) ln(P )
K −
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  … (1) 
  where: 
 
tR  is the trade-to-trade return adjusted for the interval 
effect 
 
tP  is the stock’s traded price in period t 
 
t Kt
P −  the price of a stock  tK  periods in the past 
 
tK  is the length of time (in days) between the trade in 
period t and the previous successive trade 
 
However, even when returns are calculated on a trade-
to-trade basis, there is still a high prevalence of zero 
returns (see Table 5). This implies that in most cases 
stocks changed hands without having an impact on the 
stock prices. For Ghana, between 57 percent and 82 
percent of the trade-to-trade returns are zero returns, 
while for the BRVM the trade-to-trade zero returns 
range from 43 percent to 85 percent of the total returns 
calculated. Only Egypt has relatively low percentages 
of trade-to-trade zero returns ranging from 2 percent to 
23 percent of the trade-to-trade returns calculated.8 
                                                
8However, it is important to note that for Egypt, the stocks 
included in the sample are the most actively traded and the 
These zero returns are likely to lead to positive serial 
correlation in the return series. Therefore, the trade-to-
trade approach will only reduce, but not eliminate, the 
bias on our findings towards the rejection of serial 
independence. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The returns were tested for normality and all the stocks 
rejected the normality assumption using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at the 1% level of 
significance. Due to the non-normality of the returns 
series, a nonparametric measure for independence, 
that is, the runs test, is used. This test is not affected 
by any extreme values in the return series (Dickinson 
and Muragu, 1994) and thus does not require constant 
variance of the data (Barnes, 1986). The hypothesis of 
independence is tested using the significance of the 
standardised Z-values at the 5% level of significance. 
This statistic compares the observed and expected 
number of runs. The observed number of runs is the 
sequences of price changes of the same sign. The 
total expected number of runs (m) is computed as 
follows, (see Fama, 1965): 
3 2
i
i 1
n(n 1) n
m
n
=
+ − ∑
=  … (2) 
where n is the total number of price changes and in   (i 
=1,2,3) are the numbers of price changes of each sign 
- positive, negative and zero. 
                                                                                 
sample size is slightly less than 5 percent of the total number of 
stocks listed on this market. 
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Table 5: Analysis of zero returns 
 
Country/ Stock Exchange Stock market 
trading days 
Days actually 
traded 
Zero returns 
(%) 
‘True’ zero returns
(%) 
Botswana  1035 65 to 677 81 to 85 9 to 71 
BRVM 687 34 to 664 55 to 98 43 to 85 
Egypt  1342 345 to 1277 6 to 78 2 to 23 
Ghana  753 143 to 684 65 to 94 57 to 82 
Kenya  1366 38 to 1338 31 to 98 21 to 45 
Mauritius  1197 575 to 1033 56 to 76 46 to 56 
Morocco  1349 33 to 1336 22 to 98 18 to 39 
Namibia  1341 31 to 503 55 to 97 9 to 61 
Tunisia  1250 107 to 1226 18 to 94 15 to 72 
Zimbabwe  1353 81 to 1293 40 to 86 31 to 49 
Stock market trading days: These are made up of the number of days a stock exchange was open for trade for the period under 
investigation 
Days actually traded: These are the number of days when trade took place for each stock 
Zero returns: These are the number of days recording a zero return for each stock as a proportion of the number of days the 
respective stock exchange was open for trade, and are thus recorded as percentages.  
‘True’ zero returns: These are the number of days recording a zero return for each stock when the stock actually traded or 
changed hands as a proportion of the number of days trade actually took place for the stock. Also given in percentages 
 
 
According to Fama (1965), for large n, the distribution 
of m is approximately normal and the Z-value is 
calculated as follows: 
1
2
m
r m
Z
σ
+ −=  … (2) 
 
where r is the observed number of runs, the “½” is the 
discontinuity adjustment factor and mσ  is the standard 
error of m and is given by:  
3 3 32 2 3 3
i i i
i 1 i 11
m 2
1
2
n n n(n 1) 2n n n
iσ
n (n 1)
= ==
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+ + − −∑ ∑ ∑⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 … (3) 
where all the variables are as defined before  
 
A negative Z-value implies that the observed number 
of runs is less than the expected number of runs and 
thus positively correlated. The opposite is true for a 
positive Z-value. 
 
The majority of stocks for Ghana and Mauritius 
rejected the random walk hypothesis using the runs 
test. Whereas 80% of stocks rejected the random walk 
hypothesis for Ghana, on the Stock Exchange of 
Mauritius, all the stocks in the sample rejected the 
random walk hypothesis at the 1% level of 
significance. For the other markets, more than half of 
the stocks for the BRVM (54%) and Egypt (54%) and 
exactly half the stocks for Botswana also rejected the 
random walk hypothesis using the runs test, whilst for 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tunisia and Morocco, less than half 
of the stocks in the respective samples rejected the 
hypothesis. For all the markets, except Kenya, the 
runs test indicates positive correlation tendencies for 
most stocks, when disregarding significance (see 
Table 6). The deviations from the random walk by the 
stocks on these markets suggest that the possibility of 
detecting patterns, which can be profitably traded 
upon, cannot be entirely dismissed. One clear 
exception is Namibia, where all the stocks in the 
sample, except one, exhibited random walk behaviour 
at the 5% level of significance. Kenya and Zimbabwe 
are also considered to be weak-form efficient since the 
majority of stocks conformed to the random walk 
hypothesis. 
 
4.1 Higher order serial correlation9 
 
Bekaert and Harvey (2002) indicated that emerging 
market stock returns exhibit higher order serial 
correlation. To investigate this assertion in the current 
research, a hypothesis that the correlation coefficients 
of trade-to-trade returns at all lags are zero is tested 
against the alternative that not all correlation 
coefficients are zero. This hypothesis is tested using 
the Box-Ljung Q-statistic, which is chi-square 
distributed with k degrees of freedom ( 2kχ ). The null 
hypothesis that all the ten correlation coefficients are 
zero is rejected if the Q-statistic for the 10 lags is 
significant at the 5% level of significance. 
 
The results, as summarised in Table 7, show that more 
than half of the stocks for each market, except 
Namibia and Zimbabwe, exhibit significant higher order 
serial correlation at the 5% level of significance.  
 
                                                
9Results from the Box-Ljung, ACF and PACF are used here to 
show the prevalence of higher order serial correlation for African 
stock markets. 
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Table 6: Number and proportion of stocks with significant Z-values for the Runs test 
 
Stock 
Exchange 
Sample 
size 
Largest Z-
values 
(absolute) 
Runs Test Z-values Overall market
All stocks Significance at the 5% level Correlation 
tendency 
Proportions of 
rejections* positive negative positive negative total
Botswana  12 3,92 - 12 - 6 6 Positive 50% 
BRVM 24 6,04 1 23 - 13 13 Positive 54% 
Egypt  54 5,70 11 43 1 28 29 Positive 54% 
Ghana  20 9,55 1 19 - 16 16 Positive 80% 
Kenya  40 5,18 24 16 11 1 12 Negative 30% 
Mauritius  9 6,64 - 9 - 9 9 Positive 100% 
Morocco  36 4,55 10 26 - 17 17 Positive 47% 
Namibia  15 2,19 6 9 - 1 1 Not clear 7% 
Tunisia  35 7,94 9 26 1 14 15 Positive 43% 
Zimbabwe  39 6,20 10 29 - 14 14 Positive 36% 
*This is equal to the number of stocks rejecting the random walk divided by the sample size (total number of stocks in the 
sample) as a percentage and is denoted p 
 
Table 7: Number of significant higher order serial correlation coefficients and the proportions of significant 
Box-Ljung Q-statistics 
 
Stock 
Exchange 
ACF (for lags 2-10) PACF (for lags 2-10) Box-Ljung 
Q-stats 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Proportions 
of 
rejections* 
Botswana  5 4 1 2 0 3 0 0 1 6 2 1 3 1 2 1 0 1 66,7% 
BRVM 12 6 3 6 3 3 3 1 3 10 6 1 4 3 3 3 0 3 66,7% 
Egypt  27 6 11 3 6 6 7 3 7 24 3 8 1 4 4 6 2 3 77,8% 
Ghana  14 12 8 5 5 2 2 3 4 11 6 4 1 4 1 2 1 2 85,0% 
Kenya  9 5 5 7 2 0 2 0 4 7 5 5 5 4 0 2 0 5 52,5% 
Mauritius  2 1 3 1 3 1 0 3 0 3 2 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 55,6% 
Morocco  6 8 5 4 3 0 7 3 2 7 7 6 3 2 0 5 3 2 50,0% 
Namibia  1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 20,0% 
Tunisia  10 4 4 5 7 6 4 0 2 6 4 2 4 5 6 3 0 1 60,0% 
Zimbabwe  5 6 6 4 2 1 3 3 4 7 4 6 5 4 1 2 2 3 43,6% 
Total 91 53 48 38 32 24 28 16 27 84 40 38 28 31 19 24 11 20  
* These are equal to the number of stocks with significant Box-Ljung Q-statistics divided by the sample size (total number of 
stocks in the sample) and are reported a percentages. 
 
Table 7 also shows that the numbers of significant 
coefficients decrease with increasing lags for both the 
autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF), but only gradually.  
Therefore, while stock returns in the immediate past 
provide information that play a significant role in 
determining future returns, the information becomes 
less and less useful the further away in the past one 
looks. However, for the African stock markets in this 
study, the importance of historical price information 
only dissipates gradually and is therefore not totally 
irrelevant in forecasting future returns. 
 
4.2 Discussion of results 
 
The positive serial correlation observed on most of the 
markets is not surprising considering that daily data 
was used for an average period of 5 years. Positive 
serial correlation is usually considered to be a 
predictability phenomenon of the short-run, while 
negative serial correlation is mostly a long run 
predictability phenomenon. The positive serial 
correlation on African stock markets might also be a 
result of institutions imitating spreading their trades 
over several days to lessen the impact of trades in 
large volumes on the market (Asal, 2000). Most 
importantly, the prevalence of zero returns on these 
African stock markets as discussed in section 3 could 
have contributed to the nature of the results.10 
 
The weak-form efficiency of the NSX can probably be 
explained by the market’s positive correlation with the 
                                                
10With this in mind, the results should be taken with a grain of 
salt as the serial correlation observed can be considered rather 
a reflection of the illiquidity of the markets. 
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JSE due to the significant number of stocks that are 
dual-listed on both markets. Tyandela and Biekpe 
(2001) found the correlation of the two markets to be 
90% and the highest for all the market correlations that 
they studied. Considering some of the recent studies, 
the JSE was found to be efficient in Magnusson and 
Wydick (2002), Smith, Jefferis and Ryoo (2002) and 
Smith and Jefferis (2002).  If the JSE is weak-form 
efficient, then one can argue that this efficiency filters 
through to the NSX since almost the same stocks are 
traded on both markets. About two-thirds of the stocks, 
which make up the sample for Namibia, are dual-listed 
on the JSE. The efficiency of the NSX can thus be said 
to be a spill-over from, or a reflection of, the weak-form 
efficiency of the JSE. 
 
The efficiency of Kenya and Zimbabwe is also not 
surprising since the two markets are among the oldest 
in Africa. The two markets, probably, gained some 
sophistication over the years, enabling them to 
interpret and incorporate information into prices 
speedily. Fama (1965, p38) highlighted the importance 
of many sophisticated traders in a market, who can 
recognise situations where the price of a stock runs 
well above or below its intrinsic value, and who 
through their actions would cause such price bubbles 
to burst before they get underway. 
 
The deviation from the random walk portrayed by the 
sampled stocks listed on the stock exchange of 
Mauritius cannot be readily explained. The rejection of 
the random walk hypothesis on this market might 
indicate the availability of exploitable profit 
opportunities, which may be due to investors not 
reacting quickly to new information and thus a slow 
adjustment of prices. Investors also, probably, adopt a 
passive investment strategy thereby failing to identify 
situations when prices deviate from their intrinsic 
values. 
 
The rejection of the random walk by some Ghanaian 
stocks could be due to limited trading time on this 
market. The Ghana Stock Exchange was trading only 
three times a week, on Mondays, Wednesdays and 
Fridays for the period under study. This could have 
resulted in price adjustment delays and thus partly 
explain why stock prices on this market deviate from 
the random walk. If new information arrived on a 
Tuesday, which was a nontrading day on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange, investors would be in a position to 
reasonably predict the price movements for 
Wednesday when the stock market opens for trade.  
 
The Z-values of the runs test are, however, small in 
magnitude for some stocks, but relatively large for 
others in comparison to those obtained in, for example, 
Fama (1965) and Dickinson and Muragu (1994). The 
largest  Z-values, which are significant at the 1% level , 
exceed 5.0 for a number of stocks across markets, 
reaching to as high as 9,546 for Ghana. In Fama 
(1965), the largest standardised value for the runs test, 
also in absolute terms, was 4,23. Dickinson and 
Muragu (1994) also found very small values in their 
study of the Nairobi Stock Exchange, with the largest 
Z-values in absolute terms of 2,987.  While Fama 
(1965) and Dickinson and Muragu (1994) hinted that 
the serial correlation they found may not be attractive 
to investors, the same cannot be readily said for the 
African stock markets studied. One major concern 
would be the illiquidity of these markets. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The paper investigated the weak-form efficiency of ten 
African stock markets using the runs test methodology 
for serial dependency. Returns were calculated on a 
trade-to-trade basis and weighted by the number of 
days between trades. Serious thin-trading was 
observed on all markets, and more so for Namibia and 
Botswana, the two markets with significant dual-listed 
stocks on the JSE. In all the markets studied (except 
Namibia), a significant number of stocks rejected the 
random walk. The weak-form efficiency of the NSX 
was attributed to its correlation with the JSE. Kenya 
and Zimbabwe were also concluded as generally weak 
form efficient, since a significant number of stocks 
conformed to the random walk. 
 
All the stocks in the Mauritius sample rejected the 
random walk at the 1% level of significance using the 
runs test. This led to the conclusion that stock prices 
on the Mauritius market tend to deviate from the 
random walk hypothesis. The same conclusion was 
made for Ghana. On the BRVM, Egypt and Botswana 
stock exchanges, chances that one can detect 
patterns in the stock prices that can used to predict the 
next price also could not be ruled out.  
 
Since rejection of the random walk does not necessary 
imply weak-form inefficiency, but the presence of serial 
correlation in stock returns, it is vital to investigate if 
such serial correlation can be exploited for abnormal 
returns, net of transaction costs. Therefore, there is 
need for further tests using technical trading methods 
that try to profitably exploit the serial correlation 
observed in this study, in order to reach definite 
conclusions on the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
African stock markets in this study.  
 
The runs test used here only tests for the existence of 
a linear relationship, which makes it inadequate as a 
testing method on African stock markets where the 
return-generating processes are assumed to be 
nonlinear.  This is because the assumptions on which 
the EMH is based are believed to be violated due to 
the heterogeneity of investors and the weak 
microstructures of the markets. The use of linear 
models would thus lead to wrong inferences being 
drawn. Therefore, further research is required to test 
the random walk hypothesis using nonlinear models 
and to investigate if the observed patterns can be 
profitably exploited. 
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